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of only 150 shares of the corporation here involved and Reed 
was the legal owner of 245 shares ( 41 Cal.2d 17) . By virtue 
of this situation Norman now contends that Reed could have 
assumed control of the corporation and has no right to bring 
a derivative action (see Jones v. Re-lJiine Oil Co., 47 Cal.App. 
2d 832 [119 P.2d 219)) but this contention may not now be 
considered as it does not appear that plaintiff has assumed 
control of the corporation and he alleges that the defendants 
have control of all the books and records of the corporation. 
Although he may own the majority of the stock by reason of 
the holding above mentioned, he has alleged and maintained 
throughout this litigation that Norman has assumed complete 
control and management of the business of the corporation 
to the exclusion of plaintiff. That is a matter that should be 
addressed to the trial court; it may not appropriately be 
considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal. 
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5939. In Bank. .Apr.12, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE Respondent, v. DAVID J. HARDEN-
BROOK, Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses- Corroboration- Prior Consistent Statements.-
Where the opposition has assailed the testimony of a witness 
as being of recent fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule 
allows the admission of evidence of statements or conduct 
prior to the claimed fabrication and consistent with the testi-
mony of the witness at the trial, not to prove the facts of the 
case, but as tending to show that the witness has not been 
[1] .Admissibility for purpose of supporting impeached witness, 
of prior statements by him consistent with his testimony, note, 140 
A.L.R. 21. See also Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 153; Am.Jur., Witnesses, 
§ 817 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Witnesses, § 280; [3] Homicide, 
§58; [4] Homicide, §62; [5] Criminal Law, §1404(14); [6] Crimi-
nal Law, § 1407(6); [7] Criminal Law, § 1404(12); [8] Criminal 
Law, § 1404(13); [9] Criminal Law, § 1092. 
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controlled by motives of interest and that he has not fabri-
cated something for the purpose of the case. 
[2] !d.-Corroboration-Prior Consistent Statements.-In a prose-
cution for first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was 
not error to permit a person to testify that a witness had 
told him, on the night preceding the crime, he had overheard 
a conversation between defendant and another named person 
as to the "planning" of killing "someone's mother," where the 
jury was clearly informed that such testimony was admitted 
only for the limited purpose of showing that prior to commis-
sion of the offense the wibH'ss, whose word was contradicted, 
made a statement as to the conversation to third parties and 
therefore it could indicate that he didn't fabricate the story 
after commission of the offense. 
[3] Homicide-Evidence-Premeditation.-In a prosecution for 
first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was not error to 
exclude the testimony of a "foster-aunt" (sister of the victim) 
to the effect that defendant was incapable of premeditation, 
the witness not being an expert. 
[4] !d.-Evidence-Prior Conduct of Defendant.-In a prosecution 
for first degree murder of defendant's mother, it was not error 
to refuse to permit a "foster-aunt" to testify concerning de-
fendant's conduct more than seven years prior to the time of 
trial, since such testimony would he too remote in point of 
time to have been of much aiel to the jury. 
[5] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prose-
cuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder of 
defendant's adoptive mother, the district attomey did not com-
mit prejudicial error during his argument to the jury in re-
ferring to defendant as a "mother-killer" and "sneaky" mother-
killer, in referring to the victim as defendant's "mother", 
whereas she was only his "foster-mother," and in referring to 
defendant as never working and having no money and being 
"no good," where the evidence showed that defendant con-
sidered his victim as his mother, that she acted toward him 
as if he were her natural son from the time he was 2 months 
of age, that he admitted having killed his "mother," that he 
had no money with the exception of perhaps a dollar on the 
night before he committed the crime, and that he had worked 
once in a while but not at one job for any length of time. 
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting At-
torney.~ ~Tn a proseeution for first degrep murder of defend-
;lut's moth<'r, no prejudice resnltPd from the district attorney's 
argument to tlw jury eow·Prniug murdPr perpetrated in the 
Nllllllli~sion of n l'(,blwry and by lying in wait, whPrF the court 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 193, 205; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
§ 321. 
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refused an instruction on and no instruction 
was on the theory that murder committed a rob-
brrv >~'as first murdPr other tlum mrre stntemcnt to 
that effect, where the jury was .fully and .fairly instructed 
concerning both tirst and second d<>grPe murder, as well as 
manslaughter, and was admonished that its duty was to follow 
the law as Htated to it by the court, and where the jury was 
also told that it was to be governed solely by evidence intro-
duced at the trial, that any instruction inapplicable to the 
facts found by it was to be disregarded, and that any state-
ments made by counsel were not to be taken as evidence in the 
case. 
[7] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error--Argument of Prosecuting At-
torney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder the People 
did not commit error in arguing to the jury that they need not 
all agree on the same theory of first degree murder if they 
agreed that defendant was guilty of first degree murder. 
[8] Id.-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting At-
torney.-A conviction of first degree murder of defendant's 
mother should not be reversed because the People argued to 
the jury that a witness had testified to seeing a gun in 
defendant's possession on two diffenmt oeeasions prior to 
commission of the crime, though the witness aetna lly testified 
to only seeing the gun once, whcrP in vi<'W of thP evidence 
and the other correct referencrs hy the prosecution to the 
witness' testimony no prejudiee resulted to drfendant from 
what was obviously a slip of the tongue, and where the jury 
was instrueted that statements and argument of counsel were 
not evidence in the ease and, if contrary to thr evidrnre, should 
he disregarded. 
[9] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of CounseL-If defendant 
demns that any harmful effect might result from a statement 
of the prosecution during argument to the jury, he should 
make timely objection at the trial so that any misunderstanding 
could be clarified hy a proper instruction. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County. 
h ,J. Mouser, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgmrnt of convirtion imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
Hussell Yeager, Public Defender (Imperial County), for 
Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and "'William E. 
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Hespondent. 
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CARTER, ,J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judgment 
imposing the death penalty after a jury verdict finding the 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and fixing the penalty 
as death. Defendant was found sane by a jury after trial 
on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The record 
does not disclose that a motion for a new trial was made by or 
on behalf of defendant. 
Defendant, David J. Hardenbrook, was the adopted son 
of the victim of the homicide, Mrs. Eleanor Hardenbrook. 
Defendant admitted both prior to and during the trial that 
he shot his adoptive mother through the back of the head 
while he was visiting her at her home on Saturday, March 
17, 1956. The major question involved concerns the degree 
of the crime-whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
finding of murder in the first degree or whether it shows only 
second degree homicide. The admissibility of certain evidence 
from which the jury could have inferred that the crime was 
premeditated is questioned as being erroneous and prejudicial. 
On Thursday, March 15, 1956, defendant borrowed a .22 
caliber automatic pistol with the avowed purpose of using it 
for target practice. Scott, a witness for the People, testified 
that he saw the defendant on the night of March 15th, at 
the Tropics Bar and Cafe in Imperial at about 8 o'clock in 
the evening and that defendant was showing a .22 automatic 
pistol to some people sitting at the bar and that defendant 
said the gun was his. Scott testified that he, the defendant 
and three other persons left the cafe and bar after about an 
hour and went to Brawley; that defendant wanted to stop at 
his mother's house; that they stopped and defendant went in, 
had something to eat, came back out and they all proceeded to 
another bar just outside of Brawley. During this time the 
gun was in the back of Scott's car. After going to another 
bar Scott drove defendant back to the El Centro Hotel where 
he was living; defendant was "pretty sickening drunk" and 
left the gun in Scott's car. 
On Friday, March 16th, Scott saw defendant leaving the 
Post parking lot on the outside of the naval air station base 
and stopped his car so that defendant could get in. Scott and 
defendant then drove to El Centro where Scott bought some 
bullets for the gun so that they could do some target prac-
ticing. They drove towards Imperial and then to a place 
called New River where they did some target shooting. Out 
of a box of 50 shells, nine were left and defendant wanted to 
save them. During the target shooting defendant asked Scott 
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if he knew where a silencer could be bought and what it would 
cost. On their way back defendant said someone at the gate 
wanted a ride back into town and when they came back out 
again they picked up the hitchhiker, Potter, and went into 
town. At this time it was about dusk and around 7 o'clock. 
When defendant got out of the car at El Centro he took the 
gun out of the glove compartment and got a paper bag into 
which to put it. During the ride into El Centro the matter 
of a silencer was again discussed. 
Potter, who was sitting in the back of the car during the 
ride into El Centro, testified that Scott, who was driving, 
looked "over to Hardenbrook and he said, 'Where are you 
going to kill your mother~' So Hardenbrook looked over at 
Scott and he says, 'In the bedroom, I guess.' They got to 
talking about how much a silencer cost, or where he could 
get one, and Scott said he didn't have any idea what they 
cost or where to get one.'' Potter testified that later that 
night when he got back to the base he stopped over where he 
worked and told the story to a "guy named Hum." This 
portion of Potter's testimony was denied by both defendant 
and Scott. 
Defendant testified that he had been adopted by the de-
ceased when he was about 2 months old; that he had lived 
with her up until "fairly recently" when he had moved to the 
El Centro Hotel where he lived alone. He testified to borrow-
ing the gun and showing it to several people at the Tropics 
bar; to the target shooting and to discussing the matter of a 
silencer for the gun but said that he asked about it just out 
of curiosity. He told how he and Scott picked up Potter and 
gave him a ride into town. He testified that after he got 
out of the car with the gun he went into a grocery store and 
got a paper bag in which to carry the gun; that he then went 
back to the El Centro Hotel and "put up the gun" and 
hitchhiked from there to Brawley and went to his mother's 
home where he had dinner with her after which they listened 
to the radio and played canasta; that he then hitchhiked back 
to El Centro to his hotel. He said he did not take the gun 
with him on Friday night when he went to his mother's 
home. He testified that his mother told him that if he would 
come back in the morning she would launder his clothes for 
him; that he got up around 9 :30 on the morning of Saturday, 
the 17th, and hitchhiked from El Centro to Brawley taking 
the laundry and the gun with him. He said that he took the 
gun with him so that he could clean it before returning it; 
that when he arrived at his mother's home he put the alumi-
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num box containing his clothes and the gun on a table; that 
he waited until his mother was out of the room and then took 
the gun out of the box and put it between two pillows on the 
couch becanse his "mother doesn't approve of firearms of any 
type." After hiding t be gun, defendant testified that he ate 
breakfast and sat around looking at books and listening to 
the Metropolitan opera on the radio and that ''after my 
clothes had gone through the laundry, she brought them back 
in and ~was starching them, and I went over to the conch and 
reached under the pillow and got the gun and >vent back to 
the ehair and shot her" in the back of the neek; that he didn't 
know why he did it; tl1at "it just happened"; that he hadn't 
thought about killing his mother; that they had not had any 
harsh words at any time; that vvhen he saw his mother fall 
down he realized what he had done; that he dragged the body 
from the kitchen to the bedroom. After that he testifiE'd that 
he tried to forge his mother's name to a eheck but was so 
nervous he spoiled the first one, bnt then wrote one for $75 
payable to himself by forging his mother's name; that he 
took two of her small suitcases and her car keys from her 
bedroom dresser; went out and got his mother's ear and drove 
to Brawley and eashed the chedc; that he then had gas put in 
the car and drove ont to the base where he talked with Scott; 
that he then drove out to Seal Beach where he stayed over-
night vvith some friends; that he and the friends went to the 
beach the next day; that he drove them to their home and 
went to a motel where he stayed overnight; that the next 
morning after reading about the crime in a newspaper, he 
went to a priest and confessed what he had done; that the 
priest called the pollee. On eross-examination defendant ad-
mitted that he had given his mother a great deal of trouble 
over money and the car and that she had suggested that he 
mow~ out of her horne and ''go out on my own.'' Mrs. Harden-
brook's body was found by her landlord on March 18th. 
Over objection by defense counsel, Patrick Hum testified 
that Potter had told him on the night of the 16th of the eon-
wrsation he hacl overheard behYeen Scott and the defendant 
as to the "planning" of killing "someone's mother." At the 
time the ronrt a(1mittrd this testimony, thP jury was admon-
ishe<l as follows: "TJallies all(l )!Plltl<'!lH'Il of tlw jury, I wish 
io advise yon at this time in r.•f<'l'Pll!'l' to that -this answer 
by the witness is being· adtnittl·d for· a lilllit<•d put·pose only. 
As yon know, testimony has hePn given here by one of the 
witnesses that \vhen hr was in the ear with the defendant. 
thE're was certain eonversation in regard to the shooting of 
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one mother. 'fhe defendant, when he took the stated 
there was no such ('OnYenmtiou. Now, then thi~ answer J'i 
being a llo·wed to go i11 not for i lie purpose of the 
truth of that eonvcrsatioll, but to prove, if it proves to you, 
for your consideration, to show that at the time prior to the 
(·onunission of the offense that the witness whose word was 
()OJJtradieted, made a statement as to the eouversation to third 
pat'ties and therefore it could indicate he didn't fabricate 
the story after the commission of the offense. Now, do you 
know what I mean 1" The record shows that the jury indi-
cated its understanding in the affirmative. 
It is contended by defendant that the i rial conrt committed 
prejudicial error in permitting the witness Hum to testify 
concerning the conversation Potter had repeatefl to him on 
the night prior to the commission of the crime. [1] "It is 
the rule generally and in this state that where the opposition 
has assailed the testimony of a witness as being of recent 
fabrication, an exception to the hearsay rule allows the admis-
sion of evidence of statements or conduct prior to the claimed 
fabrication and consistent with the testimony of the witness 
at the trial, 'not to prove the facts of the case, but as tending 
to show that the witness has not been controlled by motives 
of interest and that he has not fabrieated something for the 
purpose of the case.' (People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 753-
754 [104 P.2d 7941; see also Swenzey v. Valley Transport, 
Inc., 6 Wn.2d 324 [106 P.2fl 567, 111 P.2d 1010, 140 .A.L.R. 
1]; 140 .A.L.R. 93.)" (People v. Walsh, 47 Cal.2d 36,41 
[301 P.2d 247] .) [2] It is apparent that the court did not 
err in permitting the witness Hum to testify since the jury 
was clearly informed that snch testimony was admitted only 
for the limited purpose set forth in the decided cases as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. (See alRo People v. Doetsch man, 
69 Cal.App.2d 486, 491-492 [159 P.2fl 418] ; B£ckforcl v. 
Mause1·, 53 Cal.App.2d 680, 686-687 [ 128 P.2<1 79] ; Davis v. 
Tannet·, 88 Cal.App. 67, 76-77 [262 P. 1106] .) 
[3] Defendant contendR that the trial eourt eommitted 
prejudicial error in refnsing to permit him to offer testimony 
of a "foster-aunt" (siRter of the vietim) to the effect that he 
was ineapable of premeditation. '!'he eonrt ruled that the 
witness could testify to '' eertain faets in eonnection with 
eertain thillgR that haYe happened in the past for the limited 
purpose of the jury considering such eYidence for whatever 
YahH' it may have, if any, in considering whether this individ-
ual has the power of mind to premeditate" but that not being 
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an expert the witness could not testify as to any opinion held 
by her as to defendant's ability to premeditate nor could she 
testify to aets and occurrences occurring during the time 
before defendant \Yas 14 years of age. (It was admitted by 
counsel that at the time of the crime defendant was 20 years 
of age and that at the time of trial he was 21 years of age.) 
After the court's ruling, defense counsel said : ''I am sorry 
for taking so much time, we might as well forget about it. 
It is too general under your ruling, Judge." No effort was 
made by defendant to call the witness for testimony concerning 
conduct on the part of defendant during the seven years 
preceding the trial. Under the circumstances shown by the 
record it appears that the court did not err in excluding 
opinion evidence given by a lay person. In People v. Wells, 
33 Cal.2d 330, 345 [202 P.2d 53], medical evidence of the 
defendant's state of mind was held to have been improperly 
excluded at the trial of the general issue. In the case at bar, 
the defense offered no medical testimony concerning the 
defendant's ability to form an intent to commit a crime al-
though the defendant was permitted to testify that he usually 
acted on "impulse" and that he had spent some time in 
Camarillo State Hospital. [4] There also appears to have 
been no error in the trial court's refusal to permit the lay 
witness to testify concerning defendant's conduct more than 
seven years prior to the time of trial since such testimony 
would be too remote in point of time to be of much aid to the 
Jury. 
[5] The defendant contends that the district attorney com-
mitted prejudicial error in numerous instances during his 
argument to the jury. It is argued that the district attorney's 
references to the defendant as a "mother-killer" and 
"sneaky" mother-killer were intended to instill passion and 
prejudice against the defendant in the minds of the jurors ; 
that the reference to the victim as the "mother" of the 
defendant had no basis in the record in that she was only his 
"foster-mother." It is also argued that the district attorney's 
references to defendant as never working and having no money 
and as being "no good" had no foundation in the record. 
Insofar as the references to the deceased as the defendant's 
mother are concerned, the record shows that the defendant 
considered her his mother and that she had acted toward him 
as if he were her natural son from the time he was 2 months 
of age. The record also shows that defendant at all times 
admitted having killed his "mother." The record shows that 
defendant had no money with the exception of perhaps a 
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dollar on the night before he committed the crime; that he 
had worked once in a while but not at one job for any length 
of time. 'l'hese arguments therefore appear to be without 
merit. 
(6] Error is also predicated on the district attorney's 
argument to the jury concerning murder perpetrated in the 
commission of a robbery and by lying in wait. The record 
shows that the district attorney argued that the murder was 
of the first degree in that it was premeditated on the part of 
the defendant, or committed by him when lying in wait, or in 
the course of a robbery. The trial court refused an instruction 
on "lying-in-wait" and no instruction was given on the theory 
that murder committed during a robbery was first degree 
murder other than a mere statement to that effect. The jury 
was fully and fairly instructed concerning both murder of 
the first and second degree, as well as manslaughter, and the 
jury was admonished that its duty was to follow the law as 
stated to it by the court. The jury was also told that it was 
to be governed solely by the evidence introduced at the trial 
"and the law as stated to you by me"; that any instruction 
inapplicable to the facts as found by it was to be disregarded; 
that any statements made by counsel were not to be taken as 
evidence in the case. Under the circumstances it would appear 
that defendant suffered no prejudice from the remarks of 
the prosecution in its arguments when the evidence concerning 
defendant's conduct in his mother's home was commented 
upon as well as the comments upon the evidence as it related 
to defendant's taking of the deceased's car and traveling bags. 
These facts were in evidence and any comments by the prose-
cution concerning theories of the law inapplicable thereto 
could not have been considered by the jury in view of the 
admonition of the trial judge since it must be presumed that 
the jury followed the law as given to it by the court. 
[7] Defendant argues that the People committed prejudi-
cial error in arguing to the jury that they need not all agree 
on the same theory of first degree murder if they agreed 
that defendant was guilty of first degree murder. In People v. 
Chavez, 37 Cal.2d 656, 671, 672 [234 P.2d 632], where the 
same question was first raised in this court, we held '' '. . . 
It was not necessary to require the jury to agree upon the 
theory. If, under any one of the theories set forth, they 
believed appellant had gained possession of and appropriated 
to his own use the moneys of Pacific, he was guilty of grand 
theft.' [Quotation from People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal.App.2d 
48 C.2d-12 
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256 [130 P.2(l495].] The same rule is applieable to 
the various grounds upon which the jnry could have found 
Ch:we?: guilty of murrler in the first rlegree." 
[8] Defendant also eoni ends that the People committed 
prejudicial error in that the evidence was misquoted. It is 
argued that the prosecuting attorney argued to the jury that a 
witness, Heise, had testified to seeing the gun in defendant's 
possession on two different occasions prior to the commission 
of the crime. Defendant's argument is that the witness Heise 
saw the gun only once on the Thursday preceding the homi-
cide. The record shows that Heise testified that he saw the 
gun on Thursday at the \Vaikiki Bar and that it was in a box 
inside a paper bag and that it was unloaded. He also testified 
that he saw defendant the following evening at the \Vaikiki 
again and that he had the same paper sack with him; that 
the witness asked defendant if he were still carrying "that" 
around with him and that defendant said "yes"; that defend-
ant, on the second occasion, showed him the clip he had for 
the gun and that it had shells in it. 'l'he prosecuting attorney 
pointed out to the jury that on the second occasion Heise 
didn't see the gun but that he did see the paper bag and the 
clip with the shells in it. In his closing argument the prose-
cuting attorney argued to the jury that Heise saw the gun 
twice-once on Friday night. No obj(•ction was interposed by 
defense counsel and, in view of the evidence and the other 
correct references by the proseeution to the testimony of 
Heise it is difficult to see how any prejudice could have re-
sulted to defendant from what was obviously a slip of the 
tongue. Further, the jury was instructed that the statements 
and arguments of counsel were not evidence in the ease and, 
if contrary to the evidence, should be disregarded. 
A reading of the prosecution's arguments to the jury dis-
proves defendant's contention that an appeal was made to 
the jury in order to arouse passion and prejudice against the 
defendant, and that the prosecution argued its personal belief 
as to defendant's guilt. The remarks made did not exceed the 
bounds of fair comment on the evidence and the so-called 
"personal belief" remarks were pleas to the jury to bring in a 
first degree verdict. [9] It shonld also be noted that defense 
counsel made no objer.tion during the arguments. "If appel-
lant deemed that any harmful effect might attach to the state-
ment in question, he should have made timely objection at the 
trial so that any misunderstanding could have been clarified 
by a proper instruction to the jury." (People v. Amaya, 
40 Cal.2d 70, 79 [251 P.2d 324] .) 
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There was substantial evidence in support of the jury's 
rletermination and its finding will not be disturbed. (People v. 
Smith, 15 Cal.2d 640, 648 [104 P.2d 510]; People v. Amaya, 
40 Cal.2d 70, 81 [251 P.2d 324] .) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6788. In Bank. Apr.19, 1957.] 
STATE Ol;~ CALIFORNIA, SUBSEQUENT INJURIES 
.B'UND, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COM-
MISSION and GUS'l' ERICKSON et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Law Governing.-Since an indus-
trial injury is the basis for any compensation award, the law 
in force at the time of the injury is to be taken as the measure 
of the injured person's right of recovery. 
[2] Statutes-Prospective and Retrospective Operation.-Statutes 
are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly 
made to appear that such was the legislative intent. 
[3] !d.-Prospective and Retrospective Operation.-Legislative in-
tent in favor of the retrospective operation of a statute can-
not be implied from the mere fact that the statute is remedial 
and subject to the rules of liberal interpretation. 
[4a, 4b] Workmen's Compensation - Insurance and Insurance 
Funds- Retrospective Operation of Statutes.- Lab. Code, 
§ 5500.5, providing for reimbursement from the Subsequent 
Injuries Fund by means of "an award in favor of the employer" 
who has paid the original award to an employe suffering 
silicosis resulting from underground metal mining operations 
where other employers who have not contributed to such pay-
ment are beyond the commission's jurisdiction, dead, insolvent, 
or not subject to enforcement of the award, but not declaring 
that such reimbursement provisions shall be given retrospective 
operation, should not be retrospectively applied where the in-
jury occurred prior to the effective date of such code section. 
[5] !d.-Insurance and Insurance Funds-Retrospective Operation 
of Statutes.---'l'hongh payments from the SubsPquent Injuries 
[ 1] SteP Cal.Jur., Workmren's Compensation, § 7; Am.Jur., Work. 
lllten's CompPnsation, § 32. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 10; [2, 3~ 
Statutes, § 24; [ 4-8] Workmen's Compensation, § 244. 
